In this case, the NHS Foundation Trust applied for an interim injunction on behalf of one of the hospitals it operated, the National Hospital for Neurology and Neurosurgery (a 12-bed ward for those requiring acute neuropsychiatric care for up to 14 days where the patient’s stay could be extended to 28 days in extreme circumstances).

The Trust had sought to discharge one of its patients, referred to as MB, but she had refused to leave, saying that the care package being offered by the London Borough of Camden Council was insufficient. She had mental capacity but a diagnosis of functional neurological disorder with variable upper and lower limb weakness, tremor and speech disturbance, chronic migraine, fatigue and generalised pain, complex psychological conditions, including PTSD, disrupted attachment, OCD, possibly borderline personality disorder and Asperger’s syndrome.

MB’s representative argued that due to her disabilities (she was wheelchair and bed bound) and complex mental health conditions, discharging her without properly addressing her concerns could lead to her suffering extreme distress as well as being at risk of self-harming or of committing suicide. Discharging her in this way would leave the hospital in breach of its responsibilities under articles 3, 8 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and would amount to disability discrimination and a breach of the duty to make reasonable adjustments, contrary to ss. 29 and 149 of the Equality Act 2010, it was argued.

MB had been residing at the ward since collapsing at home on February 18th 2019.

Staff felt that she could be discharged safely and the local authority had offered adapted accommodation and 24-hour care for 1 month and then extended to 3 months by concession for reassurance, but MB wanted guaranteed care for a whole year and refused to leave.

The judge dismissed the hospital’s subsequent possession claim for MB’s room as ALL such claims have been stayed for 90 days under CPR Pt 55 due to the the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the Civil Procedure Rules do not apply to preclude a claim for an injunction, which the hospital applied for on April 3rd.

The judge heard from MB and her sister, and from hospital staff. Most of the evidence for her prompt discharge from the ward was provided by Dr Christofi, a consultant neurologist working for the hospital. Dr Christofi described MB’s behaviour as unmanageable and often aggressive and threatening. He said “It is of paramount importance that [MB] is discharged from [the Hospital/UCLH] immediately. Not only do we need the beds for critically unwell patients, but remaining in a hospital environment places [MB] at unnecessary risk of contracting COVID-19. It is therefore undoubtedly in [MB’s] best interests to be discharged to a safer location urgently.” Dr Christofi was of the view that the care package consisting of 24hr care was reasonable and that there had been no self-inflicted risk incidents to indicate that MB was a risk to herself.

“She engages in activities such as watching films on her laptop. No psychotic symptoms have been observed (relating to hearing voices, nihilistic delusions etc over the time she has been in hospital). Her plans for DSH [deliberate self-harm]/suicide and not in the context of depression. Her history suggests threats of DSH when her needs are not met…She may well try DSH if she found herself in a situation where her perceived needs are not met and I cannot predict with certainty that she will not harm herself.there are no mental health reasons I can think of to keep her in this hospital.”

MB was not allowed to adduce independent medical evidence. Her main concerns with the care package were due to her distrust of Camden Council and the impending 3 month review which she believed would strip her of the 24hr care.

Although this was not an application for judicial review, MB was effectively raising a public law defence to a private law claim for possession, which is allowed as a matter of principle, without any application for permission, as would be essential if she had been the applicant in the Administrative Court. The judge could not see any good reason for permitting her to adduce evidence that would not be admissible on a direct public law challenge; judicial review would not be an appropriate forum for challenging a clinical view that a person was fit for discharge. Moreover, clinicians cannot be required to provide treatment contrary to their own clinical judgement; the treating team’s view was that the patient did not require hospital care and could safely be discharged.

The judge concluded that MB’s care needs could certainly be met by the care package offered to her by Camden. He felt that the Council had made considerable efforts to accommodate her concerns but that it was unrealistic to think that it would ever satisfy them, due to her distrust in them and the hospital. He said that there was a moderate to low risk of MB resorting to suicide or self-harm if discharged now but accepted that she would likely suffer extreme distress. In either case, this could be managed by the 24hr care offered in her care package, in his view.

Regarding the nature of the property rights being protected, the judge said this:

“The Claimant brings this claim to enforce its private law rights as property owner. As a matter of private law, MB became entitled to occupy the room she is currently in because the Claimant permitted her to do so by admitting her to the Hospital. The Claimant has now terminated her licence to occupy that room. It follows that she is now a trespasser.

Ordinarily, the Claimant would be entitled to seek an order for possession pursuant to CPR Pt 55: see e.g. Barnet Primary Care Trust v H [2006] EWHC 787 (QB), (2006) 92 BMLR 17 (Wilkie J); Sussex Community NHS Foundation Trust v Price (HHJ Coe).

That is not currently possible because of the general stay on possession claims effected by CPR 51Z PD.

The stay does not, however, affect claims for injunctions: see para. 3 of the Practice Direction. A property owner is in general entitled to an injunction to enforce its rights as against a trespasser: see the decisions of the Court of Appeal Manchester Corporation v Connolly [1970] Ch 420 and Supreme Court in Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs v Meier [2009] UKSC 11, [2009] 1 WLR 2780.

A hospital is no different from any other proprietor in this regard.”

The order made was as follows, regardless of the realistic prospect of vociferous non-co-operation:

(a) MB must leave the Ward by [a particular time], provided that by that time the Hospital has made arrangements to facilitate the transfer of MB (by ambulance trolley and ambulance) and her belongings from the Ward to the accommodation to which she is to be discharged;

(b) if such arrangements are made, MB must not obstruct or impede their implementation;

(c) MB may thereafter not re-enter the Hospital’s premises without the prior written permission of the Claimant, save if admitted by ambulance.

If MB does not comply, she will be in contempt of court and the full range of the court’s coercive powers will be available to enforce it.

The judge went on to consider whether MB had any prospect of defending the claim, because if she did, he could not conscionably grant an injunction, because it would effectively determine the case on possession, prematurely.

He said this too:

“It is a tragic feature of MB’s complex constellation of mental health difficulties that she frequently suffers from extreme distress, whether she is in hospital or not. But, if the Hospital were precluded from doing anything which might precipitate such distress, it would soon end up in a situation where it was legally precluded from taking any step other than in accordance with MB’s wishes. In this case, MB would be entitled to insist on the provision of whatever she considers she needs as a condition of discharge from hospital, even if the result of her doing so were that the needs of others could not be met. That is not the law, because her needs are not the only ones that the law regards as relevant.

In some circumstances, a hospital may have to decide which of two patients, A or B, has a better claim to a bed, or a better claim to a bed in a particular unit, even if ceasing to provide in-patient care to one of them will certainly cause extreme distress or will give rise to significant risks to that patient’s health or even life.

A hospital which in those circumstances determines rationally, and in accordance with a lawful policy, that A’s clinical need is greater than B’s, or that A would derive greater clinical benefit from the bed than B, is not precluded by Article 3 ECHR from declining to offer in-patient care to B.

This is because in-patient care is a scarce resource and, as Auld LJ put it in R v North West Lancashire Health Authority ex p. A [2000] 1 WLR 977, at 996, “[i]t is plain… that article 3 was not designed for circumstances… where the challenge is as to a health authority’s allocation of finite funds between competing demands”.

Decisions taken by a health authority on the basis of finite funds are, in my judgment, no different in principle from those taken by a hospital on the basis of finite resources of other kinds.

In each case a choice has to be made and, in making it, it is necessary to consider the needs of more than one person.

Analytically, the reason why a decision to require a patient to leave a hospital is unlikely to infringe Article 3 ECHR is because it is based on a prior decision not to provide [further] in- patient care. Such a decision engages the state’s positive (and limited) obligation to take steps to avoid suffering reaching a level that engages Article 3, rather than its negative (and absolute) obligation not itself to inflict such suffering. Where the decision to discontinue in-patient care involves the allocation of scarce public resources, the positive duty can only be to take reasonable steps to avoid such suffering: cf R (Pretty) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2002] 1 AC 800, [13]-[15] (Lord Bingham). It is difficult to conceive of a case in which it could be appropriate for a court to hold a hospital in breach of that duty by deciding, on the basis of an informed clinical assessment and against the background of a desperate need for beds, to discontinue in-patient care in an individual case and, accordingly, to require the patient to leave the hospital. The present is certainly not one.

Even though the decisions to cease to provide in-patient care to MB and to require her to leave, plainly interfere with MB’s right to respect for private and family life, the evidence adduced by the Claimant amply demonstrates that the interference was justified in order to protect the rights of others, namely those who, unlike MB, need in-patient treatment. Bearing in mind the broad discretionary area of judgment applicable to decisions of this kind, there is no prospect that MB will establish the contrary.”


People may need to know during the Covid 19 period whether they can bring proceedings for possession against anyone whom they would wish to evict for a good reason – residential licensees, for instance, sharing premises with a resident landlord, or from a care home, when the home does not wish to have the person back, after a spell in hospital. This route of seeking an injunction enables some protection of a property owner’s rights, even if no possession order can be granted.

The judge did accept that a decision by an NHS hospital not to provide in-patient care in an individual case might, in principle, be challengeable on public law grounds, by judicial review if the decision were tainted by improper purpose or had been made in breach of statutory duty or otherwise contrary to law. So that preserves public law challenges for anyone in the Covid19 period to raise, for instance on the basis of a blanket policy of non admission or non selection of anyone aged over 90, or just based on being disabled intellectually or physically, assuming the property owner is a public body amenable to judicial review, such as hospitals. The difference between this and any other case that might arise is that here, the view was very firmly that this woman MB did not NEED any other treatment the hospital could give her, whereas in a Covid competition for a ventilator, it will be different, one can only presume.

An interesting question arises in the context of care homes, who do owe human rights, directly to publicly funded clients, but who are not public bodies in the normal sense required by public law before one can bring judicial review – they do not shoulder the actual public function of a council in meeting needs, when contracted to the council, nor act as a delegate.

If one reads the full case, one discovers that the offer of 24 hour care was being made in the context of a tenancy, which MB had been willing to sign. We do not know how that came about but it is a dearly held principle of CASCAIDr’s legal experts that an offer of care cannot be made conditional upon a council’s expectation that a person provides themselves with housing, and pays for it, before it will provide the care. MB had declined services in her own home; she had declined services in a care home setting, and the Council had just kept on trying to obtain her agreement instead of treating her as capacitated to refuse offers they were satisfied were reasonable. That is not a necessary position for any council to take when a person blocking a bed has capacity; but if it does continue to try to reach agreement, that is the council’s choice, and it must still act under the Care Act.

As noted Ground floor wheelchair accessible accommodation was eventually found which could be secured through a tenancy as opposed to a temporary licence. MB’s willingness to move to the particular accommodation finally identified and adapted must be assumed, because she had signed a tenancy, but if she had been told that she was obliged to take on that tenancy in order to obtain discharge from hospital (as happens to many other people with autism in ATUs, for instance) we think that that would have made for a much stronger public law challenge against the council in a different court.

Here is the link to the full judgment: