Author Archive for belindaschwehr – Page 2

A council successfully defends a cut to a Care Act care plan by phasing in a big cut, slowly


CASCAIDr’s CEO has long suggested during training sessions that mincing towards meanness is much harder to challenge, even with use of public law principles, in the context of adults’ social care or CHC services, than making a giant cut overnight.

If commissioners aren’t care aware, and care managers and reviewers are risk averse or incentivised to make immediate savings, of course too MUCH risk or too LITTLE risk will be factored into any programme of cuts.

Such is the impact of no longer training social work students in how LAW actually WORKS, or front line public sector staff and senior managers in “difficult conversations”, it is suggested.

However, in a recent case, Lewisham Council has shown that massive cuts can be justified, as long as they are implemented slowly and the impact is genuinely monitored.

That, we have to say, is defensible social work, rationing public money properly, but it is not the modern way.

Making a judgment as to a Court’s reaction, in cases like this, is one of the reasons why CASCAIDr exists. This would not have been a case that we would have been likely to lend our support, all the way to court, although just as in the pre-Act Cambridgeshire, and post-Act Oxfordshire cases it seems that it was the proceedings that succeeded in MAKING the council do the job properly in the end. What a waste of resource, is all we can say.

In the 2018 ‘VI’ case, R (VI) v Lewisham LBCthe claimant was a long-term recipient of social care services – firstly, commissioned services and then through direct payments.

She was a 55-year-old woman with muscular dystrophy, who was bed- and wheelchair-bound and who required carer support for all personal care. She had reduced dexterity in her hands. She was continent, and used to wearing pads during the day and night if no carers were expected, although she did not like having to do so and the pads sometimes overflowed.

She’d been used to having 104 hours a week for a number of years including a specification for double handed care 3 times a day and night time care through a sitting service. Then a hoist was fitted, but no change was made; the council very fairly openly admitted to its failure to review being the reason the planned cut was not made when first assessed for.

En route to the final plan for the cut, the council had said this in writing, rather unfortunately:

“Lewisham is unable to provide an overnight service to enable you to continue to be supported to the toilet during the night. Lewisham has limited resources and that requires that we ensure we make the best use of the resources for all clients. Lewisham social services believe that pads are the solution to managing incontinence over the night time period and that is an approach used for all clients with similar needs. It has therefore been recommended that your night time need should be managed through the use of incontinence pads. The use of pads is considered a practical and appropriate solution to your night-time toileting needs.”

The judge agreed that a decision in the terms of that sort of communication could not amount to an assessment complying with the Act, because it was a generic decision relating to the management of incontinence rather than one reflecting a consideration of the Claimant’s individual needs and well-being.

[We agree and often use this argument: that’s a policy change about what is appropriate or not in relation to the duty to meet needs and we don’t see why it should not have been consulted over. But in light of the McDonald case, if it HAD BEEN CONSULTED OVER PROPERLY, it cannot be said that the policy was automatically unlawful, however – it all depends. What is clear is that it would not be lawful if it had been automatically appliedthat would have been a fetter of discretion.]

By 2016, Lewisham had completed a care and support plan that reduced the Claimant’s hours to 52 hours a week.

In practice, though, even now, no reduction was implemented, apparently due to administrative oversight and the Claimant continued to receive direct payments at the rate of 104 care hours a week.

[It is perhaps no wonder that people despair of social care ever running efficiently with cases such as these!]

What happened eventually?

By 2018, the proposed cut was going to take the care down to 40 hours a week, mostly by removing the night time hours allocated within the 104 hours.

The claimant alleged that Lewisham’s latest review conclusion that her needs for care and support could be met through a reduction of over 50% in her carer hours from what it had once been set at, was irrational.

It was said that since her condition was degenerative, cogent reasons were therefore required for concluding that her care needs had reduced from the previously assessed level.

The basis on which the Defendant asserted that the Claimant’s needs had hitherto been ‘over-provided for’, was ‘flawed’, it was asserted. Over- generosity can be a justification for a cut, of course, because it’s all coming out of public money, and all the council need ever do is to meet need appropriately, not aspirationally!

The Claimant also contended that failure to co-operate with NHS services, particularly over occupational therapy and physiotherapy, had flawed the assessment of the Claimant’s needs and ignored the best way to prevent care needs arising in the future.


An MDT meeting had ultimately been convened at the Claimant’s home, attended by the Claimant, two social workers and two district nurses.Ms Dawson’s typed note of the “MDT Outcome” stated as follows:

“Trial 6 week period agreed for reduction of care package, removing the night time care of 7 hours for incontinence support, pad changing and body turning with close monitoring from DN [district nurse] x2 weekly.

Exact plan to be confirmed and agreed alongside start date with DN and [the Claimant]. [Direct payments] team to be informed of change to care plan.

To be reviewed as ongoing via DN assessments/visits.”

This plan was to be reviewed at 6 weeks by the social worker, with district nurse visits twice a week in the meantime to monitor and record.

In August the council completed a care and support plan for the Claimant including a reduced care package of 40 hours a week, based on four one-hour single handed personal care visits a day (3 visits on Sunday) (27 hours in total), 7 hours a week meal preparation, 3 hours weekly domestic and shopping support and 3 hours weekly community support.

The Claimant made the point that the 22 August 2017 plan and 23 August 2017 letter flowed from the generic June 2016 decision and did not attempt to assess the impact on the Claimant’s well-being of the removal of her night time care.

But the social worker’s evidence was as follows:

i) The incontinence service had recommended the use of more robust pads in 2017, which were supplied.

ii) The Claimant had not sought medical advice about faecal difficulties, and there was no evidence of her having raised this with social workers or the occupational therapy service. There was no sign of any link between such episodes as had occurred and the reduction in the care plan.

iii) There was no evidence of pressure sores occurring since the care plan reduction. Further, “District Nurses have been very closely involved, their professional opinions have been sought in order to be confident that there are no significant risks of pressure sores, that toileting can be managed through use of pads and a specialised mattress used to address the issue of positioning and assist pain management, and that the Claimant is not being placed in unnecessary risk.”

In March 2018 the Defendant finalised the care needs assessment and sent it to the Claimant.

[i] “[The Claimant] was formally diagnosed with Muscular Dystrophy … in 2007. … It was reported that there is ‘no treatment or cure … and the condition is slow progress … won’t be ambulant … will need a wheelchair.”

[So the fact of degeneration was clearly acknowledged as relevant to considering what was needed.]

[ii] “[The Claimant] was assessed in June 2016 as she was receiving a 104 hours weekly care package. This identified double handed care. However, through further assessment and review discussion [the Claimant] confirmed that she did not use the service as double handed as it was not needed and instead had used the hours to implement a night time carer service seven days a week.

The view presented by the DNs at the MDT meeting was that given [the Claimant’s] equipment and level of mobility, removing her night care allocation would not put her at significant risk of developing pressure sores.

To manage risk, we agreed that the DNs would visit twice weekly to monitor pressure areas. This was also to manage [the Claimant’s] understandable anxiety. Currently the district nurses continue to visit [the Claimant] twice weekly. All their reports state that her skin is intact and no evidence of pressure sores.”

Lewisham therefore contended that the Claimant’s stance amounted to little more than a disagreement with the outcome of the assessment. A careful reading of the assessment demonstrates that it:

  • was completed with multidisciplinary input from both health and social work professionals;
  • fully involved and consulted the Claimant;
  • had clear regard to the factors as required by section 9(4);
  • complied with the provisions of the Act, regulations and guidance; and
  • took into account all material considerations.

Lewisham also contended that the woman had failed meaningfully to consider any alternative more suitable avenue for dispute resolution, including ADR or by exhausting the Defendant’s own complaints process and, if necessary, escalating any complaint to the Local Government and Social Care Ombudsman.

[That submission was not taken up by the judge, and we think that that is a further indication that the courts will not often be persuaded to regard arguable cases as able to be resolved by way of a different jurisdiction that does not encompass matters of illegality.]

The judge agreed that certain of the statements in the assessment are expressed in a somewhat conclusory way:

[x] (“Joanne explained that there is no evidence suggesting that there is a need for this additional intervention“)

[xx] (“It was explained that this is not based on assessed need and therefore not approved“).

“Those passages might be said to lend support to the Claimant’s submission that the decision-maker has taken the 2016 and 2017 decisions as read, without actually performing an assessment of the Claimant’s needs and the impact on her of the reduction in care.”

The point might also be made that passage [ii], referring to the June 2016 decision, appears to be erroneous in assuming that the Claimant herself had used spare care hours to implement night care, whereas in fact the 2011 and 2014 assessment both concluded that the Claimant required night care.”

“Viewing the assessment in the round, I consider that the decision-maker has not simply adopted the 2016 and 2017 decisions but has had regard to all the current circumstances in considering the Claimant’s needs and well-being.”

“The assessment acknowledges that the Claimant’s condition is degenerative (passage [i]). It notes that the trial removal of night care in August 2017 followed consultation with district nurses. It considers the evidence as it currently stands in relation to the Claimant’s toileting needs, including the series of reports from the district nursing team referred to in passage [xiv] reporting an absence of pressure sores and intact skin.

“The Defendant has also recognised that this is a matter which needs to be kept under careful review, and has continued to do so with weekly district nurse visits and periodic social worker visits.”

“The fact that the Claimant complained of wet leggings after outings on Sundays of approximately 5-5½ hours highlights the need for close monitoring of her needs at night during a longer period.”

“However, viewing the assessment as a whole it is not possible in my judgment to conclude that the Defendant’s approach has been irrational or that it has failed to have regard to the prescribed factors including the Claimant’s individual well-being.”

The judge said, with regard to pain, that it was noticeable that physical and mental health, of which pain relief and pain management would form part, were not included in the list of specified outcomes forming part of the eligibility criteria for Care Act purposes (see § 56 above). However, he said, “physical and mental health and emotional well-being” is one of the well-being factors referred to in section 1(2) of the Act and counsel for the Defendant was right in my view to accept that pain is therefore a relevant consideration when taking a decision under the Act.”

[CASCAIDr would comment here that the very definition of achieving the domains in the criteria includes reference to achieving but only with significant pain, anxiety or distress, or endangerment to self or others, or a much longer time to achieve the task, so it is ridiculous to suggest that such things are not part and parcel of task of considering the best value way of meeting ‘outcomes’!]

Fortunately the judge went on to say this: “It would follow that when deciding how to meet an eligible need, a local authority should take into account the fact (if the case) that one way of meeting the need is more likely to avoid or alleviate pain than an alternative way of meeting the eligible need.”

“I agree with the Defendant that the assessment gave holistic consideration to the well-being factors, including the impact of the revised care package upon the Claimant over the period of six months since it was first introduced in August 2017.

The Defendant has monitored (and continues to monitor) whether the Claimant has any additional eligible care needs that may have arisen as a result.

There is no or very limited evidence to support the Claimant’s assertion that her mental health and physical well-being have significantly deteriorated to the extent that the care package needs to change.

Neither the district nurses nor the evidence from the Claimant’s GP has given reason to believe that the removal of night time care has led to deterioration in the Claimant’s physical or mental well-being, whether in the form of pressure sores, increased pain or mental health problems.

The assessment does assess the Claimant’s eligible needs against the specified outcomes of relevance to the Claimant’s particular circumstances. The materials available, including the Claimant’s own evidence, do not identify accessing and engaging in work, training, education or volunteering as being of day-to-day relevance to the Claimant.

That position may change, but as matters stand I do not consider the assessment to have been unlawful on this ground.”

On the role of the target or general duty concerning integration with health services in the Care Act: the judge said this:

“I do not consider that the general duty in section 3(1) of the Act, or the associated provisions of the guidance, impose an absolute requirement to have specific health (including in this case physiotherapy) input during the course of making an assessment of care needs.

In the present case the assessment noted that an occupational therapy assessment had been completed on 9 September 2017, and that the Claimant had a profiling bed, mobile commode, powered chair and agreement from management for provision of a seating matters chair (see passage [vii]).

It specifically considered the Claimant’s complaint about having insufficient care hours in order to attend seated exercise groups and concluded that the current hours should be sufficient ([xviii]).”

If that assessment were to turn out to be incorrect or doubtful, then a reassessment may well be required, but I do not consider it possible to conclude that the Defendant’s decision in its March 2018 was unlawful as a result of failing to take account of needs for physiotherapy services.”

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LGO decision on financial abuse through non-payment of social care charges

This LGO’s decision from July 2018 offers some guidance on LA duties where vulnerable individuals have a DWP appointee. 

Background

The service user, a young woman, had disabilities causing deficits regarding keeping herself safe and living independently. She lived with her father who acted as her DWP appointee; he dealt with her correspondence and managed her finances.

She received a DP to support delivery of her care, and in her direct name; she was financially assessed as able to make a contribution. He father failed to pay most assessed contributions for 18 months or so, running up a debt of about £2000.

She was deemed to have capacity to choose her father to look after her finances, and initially said she wished him to continue doing so, which the DWP took serious account of. But he continued to let arrears mount up for another year, and the debt increased; the daughter then expressed a wish to take more control of her finances, and she moved into supported living.

The father agreed with the LA that he would stop acting as appointee but he did not action that agreement.

When the care staff at her tenanted accommodation realised she didn’t have enough money to meet her costs, they raised a safeguarding alert with the LA.  The LA neither held any strategy meeting or formally assessed her capacity and said the debt created did not constitute “significant harm” (this was pre-Care Act) – but did contact the DWP

Eventually the DWP revoked the father’s appointeeship.  The LA said the debts – by now totalling almost £3000 – were the daugher’s responsibility and would not be waived. The daughter got a representative to tell the LA that she didn’t fully understand how to manage her finances, but could do so, with support.

The Ombudsman held that the LA realised that that the woman needed help with her finances because the DWP had appointed Mr X as her appointee in the first place. They were aware that the father was not spending the daughter’s money in her best interests, and may not have understood his responsibilities.  It was aware that the daughter was kept short of money.

Findings of the LGO

The LGO view was that the LA should have completed a capacity assessment around finances.  If the LA was relying on the statutory presumption it should have recorded that it was doing so because there was enough doubt to raise the need to consider whether the presumption was rebutted. 

It should have supported the woman to manage her own finances if with support, she would be able to manage her finances; if she had capacity the LA should have considered other ways to support her vulnerabilities and sought her consent.

The council failed to give the daughter sufficient information or support to make an informed decision about who should manage her finances, and to ensure she understood the DP agreement she had signed.  It failed to meet her communication needs or consider appointing an advocate. It LA failed to consider properly whether she was or could be subject to financial abuse and failed to protect her from significant harm (a substantial debt).  It was aware that she didn’t wish to challenge her father due to her fear that it would damage their relationship but should have thought about what that could expose her to, in a more structured way.

Recommendations of the LGO

The LGO recommended that the LA should waive all arrears (almost £2000) accruing after it realised that the father was not paying the daughter’s assessed contributions; pay her £350 for the avoidable distress, time and trouble caused to her and ensure that assessments and support plans address finances adequately when there is any indication that the person needs support in that area; and finally, ensure communication needs and safeguarding concerns are appropriately recorded.

Considerations/learning for councils  

How do you ensure that appointees are clear, regarding their obligations to pay assessed contributions on behalf of the person for whom they act?

And how does this sit with a council’s need to exercise their discretion, conscientiously, to consider discounts from assessed income, for DRE – private expenditure from the funds, which are, after all, still the client’s funds, over which the council has no preferred creditor status?

Does the existence of an appointee act as a ‘flag’ for any council or CCG that the person they act for is more likely to be vulnerable/ require additional safeguards?

How effective are the council’s mechanisms for ensuring that vulnerable individuals understand their financial obligations e.g. regarding acceptance of DPs? 

How good are the capacity assessments around being able to understand the basics of a direct payment in the first place, let alone manage the payment and management obligations, such that an Authorised Person may be needed, to hold a budget as a principal, not merely as the manager (the agent) of a capacitated client? 

How good are councils at supporting individuals to have capacity around managing their own benefits based finances and/or make informed decisions about others managing them?

How do councils arrange to act quickly to avoid debts accruing to vulnerable individuals, particularly where someone else is not making required payments on their behalf?

How promptly do councils or CCGs raise alerts with the DWP if they have concerns about an appointee’s actions?

Do they ever use the specific duty of co-operation, if the DWP seems reluctant to engage with them – this would force the DWP to respond in writing, under the Care Act, s7.

How would your local safeguarding professionals respond to situations such as this?

The decision can be found at – https://www.lgo.org.uk/decisions/adult-care-services/charging/17-015-575

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A short note on the SEND Tribunal: the ‘single route of redress’ national trial

This post is by Yo Dunn, who runs ConsultYo, a legal framework consultancy and training business, specialising in autism issues – www.consultyo.com

From 3 April 2018 for two years a national trial is taking place which empowers the First-tier Tribunal Special Educational Needs and Disability (SENDIST) to make non-binding recommendations about health and social care aspects of Education, Health and Care (EHC) plans. The new powers are contained in the Special Educational Needs and Disability (First-tier Tribunal Recommendations Power) Regulations 2017.

The powers are only able to be exercised where a parent or young person is appealing some aspect of the EHC plan decision-making relating to special education to the tribunal[1]. This means that, like EHC plans themselves, this option is not available as a mechanism to challenge health or social care decision making in relation to a child or young person who has only health and/or social care needs and does not also have special educational needs. Further, the tribunal power relates only to aspects of health or social care needs or provision which are “related” to the child’s special educational needs, plus any social care provision which is being made under s.2 Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act.

Despite the non-binding nature of any recommendations themselves, there are elements of compulsion on health and social care responsible bodies.

During the tribunal process, responsible commissioning bodies can be compelled (under the Tribunal Procedure rules) to respond to requests by the Tribunal for information or evidence and to send a witness to a hearing if required by the Tribunal.

These procedural powers are potentially useful to complainants who may be struggling to obtain relevant information or documents from a health or social care commissioning body.

Perhaps even more usefully, the regulations require responsible commissioning bodies to respond in writing to any non-binding recommendations the Tribunal makes, giving reasons. Again, this is potentially useful to complainants who may be struggling to obtain a clear decision-making rationale which can then be challenged via Judicial Review based on the lawfulness of the decision making.

The power for the tribunal to make non-binding recommendations applies to recommending that particular health or social care needs are specified in the EHC plan, and/or that amendments be made to the provision specified for those needs. Note that the tribunal is not empowered to recommend amendments to the outcomes specified in the EHC plan (a limitation which also applies to the education content). This may be highly relevant where the outcomes are expressed in a manner which is vague, aspirational or loose, because appropriateness of any proposed provision will be related to the outcomes it is intended to achieve.

If, despite the non-binding nature of the recommendations, a plan was to be actually amended in response to a Tribunal recommendation, a crucial consideration is whether anyone can be held to account for whether the provision is actually made. Section 42 Children & Families Act 2014 creates clear statutory duties on: the local authority to “secure” the educational provision specified in an EHCP (s.42(2)) and the responsible commissioning body to “arrange” the healthcare provision specified in an EHCP (s.42(3)). However, there is no analogous duty regarding social care provision. Consequently, the tribunal recommendation power adds little or nothing to the enforceability of social care provision, even once it is specified in an EHCP.

The existence of this new power is likely to lead to questions as to whether an appeal to Tribunal has been pursued as a first resort approach to resolution and, if not, why not. This question will inevitably arise when approaching the Ombudsman and/or at the permission stage of a Judicial Review. In some cases, the answer may be that health or social care recommendations could not be pursued in front of the tribunal because there were no educational issues in dispute or that any education dispute had been resolved whilst the health or social care dispute remained. In other cases, it may be appropriate to point to the non-binding nature of the recommendations together with evidence, if any, of the local authority’s willingness or otherwise to modify the EHCP in response to recommendations (such as those from relevant professionals). Finally, in case where the content or wording of outcomes are disputed, the lack of tribunal power to recommend changes to outcomes may be relevant to whether an appeal to tribunal is a viable alternative for dispute resolution.


[1] This is because the qualifying criterion for issuing an EHCP is that it is necessary for Special Educational Provision to be made for the child or young person, see s.36(3) Children and Families Act 2014

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Podcast

CASCAIDr’s story in podcast form

In 2017, our voluntary CEO broke her leg – and whilst laid up, pondered a central conundrum in adult social care:

  • How does one make it viable to get good legal framework advice out to a person, at a formative moment, if he or she is struggling with the council about legal rights to care funding?
  • If the person is applying for public funding for care, he or she probably hasn’t got enough money to PAY for specialist public law legal advice.
  • Decent legal advice is always going to cost money because of the expertise required to have learned it, and applied it.
  • If advisers couldn’t earn money from the expertise, they’d have no incentive to acquire the knowledge!
  • But if the person with the legal problem, has sufficiently little to qualify for legal aid, they would then have to FIND a legal aid lawyer with a community care certificate, and enough capacity to take their case on….in less than 3 months of the action or omission causing the problem…
  • …Which is no mean feat, if one is on one’s knees with disability or illness or mental ill-health in the first place, and if one doesn’t know whether one has got a legal problem or just a complaint….
  • And if the person’s got just a bit too much money to qualify for legal aid, and fears the loss of services for rocking the boat, then they’ll probably just do nothing…and teeter into an even worse situation.

So she thought and thought, and she researched crowd-funding for public interest litigation.

She discovered that charities can crowd-fund for people’s litigation causes.

She discovered that charities can engage contractors, rather than employers, just like any other business – and pay them, if the charity has the money to do so.

She discovered that charities can even charge for services that are central to their charitable objects, without losing a claim to be acting for public benefit, as long as the charges are low enough.

And she discovered that they can own trading companies in order to trade in services that are not central to their objects, but designed to support the financial resources for the charity itself.

 

 

So, having had her A-ha! moment, she then applied for charitable status for the corporate vehicles that make up CASCAIDr and CASCAIDr Trading Ltd.

She spent her own money on legal advice to contend with the Charity Commission’s many and varied difficulties in grasping what the charity was setting out to do, and how it might work, and why it wasn’t politically motivated.

Its aim was to uphold the existing legal framework, not change the law. That is, to help people access their existing legal rights under the Care Act – a statute passed as recently in 2014, by this government, through a sovereign Parliament made up of democratically elected MPs who presumably knew what they were doing when committing the state’s tax base to funding what the Act says should happen in every single case….

Whilst exercising the minds of the Charity Commission, she managed to find a group of interesting and skilled trustees to support the charity’s operation. She created a structure whereby she has no control over the Charity as a board member, and earns no money for running it. She simply earns a case work fee which is the same as any other case worker can earn, and she has ceased to provide consultancy in her own private capacity, in order to avoid conflict of interest.

CASCAIDr now has trustees, case workers, volunteers, and ambassadors promoting CASCAIDr for free; it has writers and case note creators, reflective practice mentors, IT and social media and SEO support – and a growing number of case referrals and positive outcomes to point to. It has a business plan, a remote book-keeper, bankers, accountants, insurers, a raft of policies, ICO registration, GDPR compliance, and software renewal dates, coming out of the woodwork.

But CASCAIDr is still solvent, because we don’t have to spend all our time applying for grants from benefactors that aren’t sustainable.

We are completely independent, unlike many charities these days, who have become service providers to public bodies, delivering services at fees that enable the council to make the very same cuts that central government requires, in the name of austerity.

Our CEO’s leg has mended and although she is exhausted, she reports that the impact of doing battle for people as ‘better than HRT’.

You can listen to podcasts about the experience of giving birth to this baby, here:

1 Why a charity?
2 And why it took so long
3 How do you think you’ll be able to keep it going?
4 How do you feel now?
5 What is the difference between the free scope work and the chargeable work please?
6 What sort of support have you had so far?
7 Is it right for a charity to spend money on legal proceedings
8 How can ordinary people, and user groups, or parent carer groups get involved?
9 And what about providers?
10  Are you out to get the statutory sector or to support their doing it right?
11 is there a danger of doing too well here? Breaking the system, by enabling people to shout louder?

 

 

 

 

Why are we telling you this?

The point is that anyone can do this too, if the essence of your offer is advice and information and advocacy.

There is no charitable object listed in the Charities Act of ‘giving legal advice’ away, however cheaply you might be prepared to do this and however obviously the normal beneficiaries of charities are going to find your advice, useful.

And you cannot be politically motivated, although most charities’ aims touch on politics in the broadest sense.

But you CAN copy this model above, by using the charitable object of ‘the sound administration of the law’. It’s not specifically listed, and charity solicitors, being lawyers, ought to know about it. But it does exist, by analogy, having been established under the old law before the Charities Act was passed.

And there’s a case on it  which made all the difference to our application in the end – called HDT.

If you think about it, many registered charities’ core purpose is to give advice about people’s legal rights against governmental bodies, without it being seen as engaging in political activity. It’s often called advocacy, but the thrust is always the same – upholding welfare or human rights related law.

  • Housing charities in relation to local authorities’ statutory homelessness decisions, such as SHELTER are an example. Shelter’s charitable objects are the relief of hardship, poverty and distress of those in need, in adverse housing conditions, and the education of the public concerning homelessness and to make available the useful results of research to the public, and its activities specifically include advocacy, advice and information.
  • The Prisoners’ Advice Service and the Howard League for Penal Reform are charitable organisations one of whose main focuses is inevitably advice about rights where the defendant or respondent is a governmental body, the Prison Service;
  • Asylum Justice is another – its objects are legal advice and representation to asylum seekers, necessarily challenging governmental body decisions;
  • Citizens’ Advice Bureaux are advising every day, in relation to public sector child care decisions;
  • and many of the advice charities that advise in relation to social security decisions made by the DWP, such as the FRU, provide legal representation; others are RAISE or
  • The Public Law Project – a charity now, for a very long time. The clue is in the name, we feel!

In the HDT case, the Tribunal – overturning a decision of the Charity Commission about political purposes, held as follows:

We find that “promoting the sound administration of the law” was recognised as a description of a “fourth head” charitable purpose under the “old law” i.e. prior to 1 April 2008 (see s. 3 (4) of the Act) so that it now falls within s. 3 (1) (m) (i) of the Act.

There is no legal authority to support the view that the conduct of strategic litigation before a competent constitutional court is a proper means of advancing the sound administration of the law, but equally we have not been referred to any authority which suggests that it is not an acceptable means of advancing such a charitable purpose.

We take the view that the conduct of the very particular form of litigation supported and engaged in by HDT is an acceptable means of advancing the charitable purpose of promoting the sound administration of the law.

We consider that the public benefit requirement and the question of whether there is any risk to foreign policy from such a purpose falls to be addressed in relation to s. 4 of the Act and that we should be careful not to merge it into our consideration of the definition of a description of a charitable purpose, as the Charity Commission’s submissions seem to suggest that we should.

In any event we find…that the particular type of constitutional litigation supported and conducted by HDT is fundamentally different in nature from the activities found to be objectionable as political in McGovern v AG.

 

So please get out there and do the same thing, if you believe in what you’re doing.

If you build it, they will come!

Our aims, offering and DONATE page – the organisation’s profile and aims, and how to make donations online.

 

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The impact on individuals of crashing the social care market into the buffers

This video looks what’s really happening in Adult Social Care regarding care home bed shortages, and the lack of homecare services at the price that councils can afford

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Sourcing HOUSING after college or a stay in an Assessment and Treatment Unit

This video looks at some of the influences that are affecting access by disabled people – especially young people, to housing in which they could receive support services

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Is it lawful for LAs to have a policy of always choosing the cheaper option

This video looks at what councils can do to save money, when changing the value of a person’s care plan or the setting or the provider, without going outside the current legal framework

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Insufficient home care to go round – market management meltdown

This video looks at how people can be ‘ware-housed’ in care home when they really need to be at home, receiving care, but can’t, because not enough has been commissioned, or the price has been kept too low to make any business sense to anyone.

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How are we really doing with the care act

CASCAIDr’s Belinda Schwehr looks at how we are not doing so very well with the Care Act and how some staff are managing people’s expectations downwards

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Disappearing Direct Payments

This video looks at what councils are doing to make direct payments less and less attractive, regardless of whether it’s unlawful or not under the Care Act – so as to take back control of local care markets

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